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Freedom of Religion vs. Public School
Reading Curriculum
The first amendment guarantees that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof . . ."I From this language
comes the fundamental constitutional notion that government
and religion ought to be separate. The pursuit of this "separa-
tion of Church and State" has caused continued controversy,
and none more heated than the controversy surrounding the
influence of religion in public schools.2
It is no surprise that the curriculum of public schools has
often been the center of controversy, for the public school
classroom plays a major role in the transmission of society's
values to young students.' Parents and students who have reli-
gious objections to the values being taught are more and more
frequently bringing their disputes into court, claiming a viola-
tion of their religious liberty.4 One such dispute was at issue in
Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education.' In Mozert,
conservative Christian6 children and their parents claimed that
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. M. McCARTHY, A DELICATE BALANCE: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SCHOOLS 1
(1983) [hereinafter McCARTHY].
3. G. Sorenson, Religion and the Public School Curriculum, 31 W. EDUC. L. REP.
1065 (1986); B. Freeman, The Supreme Court and First Amendment Rights of Students
in the Public School Classroom, 12 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 1, 4 (1984).
4. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at 7.
5. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
6. For the purpose of this Note, a general definition of the term conservative
Christian is necessary in order to appreciate the conservative Christian approach to the
relevant issues. Though there is disagreement on a number of theological points,
conservative Christians generally are those who interpret the Holy Bible literally and
believe it is the inerrant word of God. They believe in the necessity of a personal faith
in Jesus Christ as savior from sin and a consequential commitment to Him as Lord.
That commitment to Christ demands that the conservative Christian look to God and
the Bible as God's word for the ultimate answers to life's moral and social issues. See
Note, Appealing to a Higher Law: Conservative Christian Legal Action Groups Bring
Suit to Challenge Public School Curricula and Reading Materials, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 437
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their first amendment right to freely exercise their religion
was burdened by compulsory reading from a basic reading
series that they claimed undermined their Bible-based world
view.' The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit, however, found that there was no burden, in the constitu-
tional sense, on the plaintiffs' right to freely exercise their
religious beliefs.8
The purpose of this Note is to analyze that appellate deci-
sion in light of recent United States Supreme Court opinions
regarding the free exercise of religion. Section I will explain
the legal issues that are relevant in deciding this and similar
free exercise cases.9 Section II will discuss the history and
background of the Mozert case.' Section III will discuss the
different opinions in Mozert." Section IV will analyze and cri-
tique the different rationales used to decide this case.'2 After
weighing the alternatives, this Note will conclude that an
accommodation should be made for plaintiffs such as those in
Mozert that would allow the students to opt-out of the reading
program that they claim undermines their religious beliefs.' 3
I. FIRST AMENDMENT LEGAL ISSUES
To understand fully the controversy in Mozert, a prelimi-
nary discussion of the religion clauses in the first amendment
is necessary. The Establishment Clause 14 and the Free Exer-
cise Clause' 5 are generally viewed by the Supreme Court as
independent mandates.' 6 The former prohibits government
from acting in any way that might further one religion as
opposed to another or that might favor religion over nonreli-
n.2 (1987) [hereinafter Higher Law]; R. QUEBEDEAUX, THE YOUNG EVANGELICALS 4
(1974).
7. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
8. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1063-66; see also infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 14-50 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 51-68 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 69-105 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 106-272 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 273-307 and accompanying text.
14. The Establishment Clause is that part of the first amendment that states,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ......
15. The Free Exercise Clause is that part of the first amendment that states, "or
prohibiting the Free Exercise thereof .... "
16. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). See generally
McCARTHY, supra note 2, at 11-12; Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69
(1970). See also infra notes 19-34 and accompanying text regarding separate tests
applied by the Supreme Court.
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gion.17 The latter prohibits government from restraining the
right of every person to choose and exercise his or her reli-
gious beliefs."8 Because they are separate mandates, the Court
has developed separate tests for determining the legality of
government action under each clause.19
The definitive test for Establishment Clause2 ° violations is
expounded in Lemon v. Kurtzman.2 1 The Lemon test is three-
pronged, requiring that, in order to be constitutional, govern-
ment action must 1) have a clear secular purpose; 2) have a pri-
mary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and 3)
not foster excessive entanglement between government and
religion.2
In the context of the public school classroom, the Court's
primary concern is that the inclusion of religious material in
school curricula creates a risk that students could perceive the
school to be supporting religion.23 Therefore, no religious
activity, no matter how voluntary, has been allowed to take
place within the public schools, lest it appear that the schools
are inculcating religious values along with important social and
democratic values, thereby favoring religious believers over
those with nonreligious beliefs.24  The Supreme Court has
found an Establishment Clause violation in every instance in
which the presence of religion could directly or indirectly
influence the beliefs of school children.
17. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 217-23.
18. Id.
19. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text regarding the Establishment
Clause test and notes 29-34 and accompanying text regarding the Free Exercise Clause
test.
20. The claim in Mozert is made under the Free Exercise Clause. However, a
discussion of the Establishment Clause is also appropriate here for the purpose of
understanding and distinguishing the two clauses, what each requires, and what each
permits. Also, there is a certain tension between the clauses; the Establishment
Clause sets some limits on the accommodations that can be made under the Free
Exercise Clause. See text accompanying note 44.
21. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). It should be noted that, "[n]otwithstanding its long and
continual use, the [Lemon] test has provoked considerable dissatisfaction, both on the
Court and among commentators." Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1644
(1987) [hereinafter Religion].
22. 403 U.S. at 612, 613.
23. See generally Religion, supra note 21, at 1660 (citing McCollum v. Board of
Education, 333 U.S. 203, 227 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). See also L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONsTrruTIONAL LAW 825 (1978) [hereinafter TRIBE] (citing McCollum, 333
U.S. 227, 238-39; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963)).
24. See generally Religion, supra note 21, at 1660.
25. N. Strossen, "Secular Humanism" and "Scientfcw Creationism'" Proposed
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When a government action is found to violate the Estab-
lishment Clause, the appropriate remedy is a prohibition of
that government action.26 Prohibition is necessary because
merely exempting an individual from participation does not
neutralize the perception that the government supports reli-
gion.' For example, when the Supreme Court found that
Bible readings in the classroom violated the Establishment
Clause, the Court prohibited that type of activity, because
merely removing the offended students from the classroom
during the readings would not eliminate the perception that
the school supported religion.'
The test and remedy for violations of the Free Exercise
Clause are markedly different from those of the Establishment
Clause, for although the two clauses are related, they protect
somewhat differing interests. Thus, an individual may have a
cause of action under one clause but not under the other.3'
The basic test in deciding free exercise claims involves
three related questions. First, has some government action
imposed a burden3 or penalty upon the exercise of a particular
Standards for Reviewing Curricular Decisions Affecting Students' Religious Freedom,
47 Omio ST. L.J. 333, 357 (1986) [hereinafter Strossen]. Strossen goes on to give
examples of the kind of action that the Court has found to violate the Establishment
Clause: mandated organized prayer, Engel, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Bible readings in the
classroom, Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); a "released time" program where religious
teachers gave religious instruction to students who had the option to attend during the
school day, in the public school classrooms, McCollum, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (instruction
was given during the school day, in the public school classrooms. Similar programs
have been found constitutional when the students were dismissed from class and
attended the religious instruction classes somewhere off the school premises), Zorach
v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); a prohibition against teaching the Darwinian theory of
evolution, which was inconsistent with the views espoused by certain religions,
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); the required posting of the Ten
Commandments on classroom walls, Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam);
and the requirement of a "moment of silence" for purposes of meditation or prayer,
even though no student was compelled to use the moment for prayer, Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (the moment of silence was not itself found to violate the
Establishment Clause, but when the legislature added the language "or prayer" to the
existing term "meditation," the statute then violated the "secular purpose" prong of
the Lemon test, as well as having the practical effect of encouraging the students to
pray). Id.
26. See, e.g., Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). See also
McCARTHY, supra note 2, at 13.
27. See McCARTHY, supra note 2, at 13.
28. Id. (citing Schempp, 374 U.S. 203).
29. Strossen, supra note 25, at 385.
30. Id.
31. Strossen states that:
A governmental policy or action will be deemed to impose such a burden if it
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religion? Second, if a burden is found, is that burden justified
by some compelling state interest? Third, if the state interest
is compelling, is imposing the burden the least restrictive man-
ner of protecting the interest involved?3 2 Thus, the test is one
of strict scrutiny; government action must be of the utmost
importance' before religious objectors can be subjected to its
regulations.3
The remedy applied in cases involving the Free Exercise
Clause is also different from the remedy for Establishment
Clause cases. In free exercise cases, the questioned government
action is only invalid as it applies to the burdened individual.'
Therefore, the remedy is to exempt the individual from the
application of the statute or actionsc The statute or action
need not be removed. In fact, prohibiting the government
action might well be unconstitutional under the Establishment
Clause because it would, in effect, mean that a religious minor-
ity could dictate the actions of government, based on religious
considerations.
A good example of a remedy for a Free Exercise Clause
violation is found in Sherbert v. Verner.38 In Sherbert, an
unemployment compensation statute in South Carolina pro-
vided compensation only to those individuals who, with "good
cause," were unable to find suitable work. Sherbert, a Sev-
enth-Day Adventist, was unable to find suitable work because
all of her potential employers wanted her to work on Saturday,
the Sabbath. Since the unemployment compensation statute
made no such exception to the requirement that a person
accept "suitable work," Sherbert was denied unemployment
has the effect of undermining religious beliefs or inhibiting religious practices
.... Such a burden generally results when the government either (1) forbids,
or imposes an impediment upon, conduct that happens to be dictated by a
religious belief, or (2) compels, or creates an incentive for, conduct that
happens to be forbidden by a religious belief.
Strossen, supra note 25, at 385 n.259 (citations omitted).
32. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comrn'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136 (1987);
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
33. The Court has stated that the compelling interest of the state must be
"paramount," Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406; "of the highest order" and "not otherwise
served," Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215; "essential" and "especially important," Bowen v. Roy,
476 U.S. 693, 728 (1986) (O'Conner, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
34. See supra note 33; Religion, supra note 21, at 1708.
35. Strossen, supra note 25, at 385 n.258.
36. Id.; MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at 13.
37. McCARTHY, supra note 2, at 13; see Religion, supra note 21, at 1670.
38. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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compensation.3 9 Thus, although the South Carolina statute
was facially neutral toward religion, 40 it was indeed oppres-
sive4 1 as it applied to Sherbert or other Seventh-Day Advent-
ists, Orthodox Jews, or anyone else with similar convictions.
The remedy was to make an exception for Sherbert and allow
her compensation so long as she could not find suitable work
that did not require her to work on Saturday.' The compensa-
tion statute itself was not eliminated because it was a fair and
legal requirement, except as it applied to certain religious
adherents.4 3
There is a natural tension between the two religion clauses
that has been troublesome for the courts.44 Allowing a reli-
gious exemption from an apparently neutral government
action under the Free Exercise Clause conflicts to some degree
with the government's commitment to favor no religion under
the Establishment Clause, because the exemption itself may
appear to advance religion.45 However, the Supreme Court,
through a line of cases including Sherbert, Wisconsin v. Yoder,
Thomas v. Review Board, and Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Commission of Florida," appears to have committed
itself to a principle of substantive religious neutrality: if a
facially neutral statute results in substantially different bur-
dens on different religious adherents, an exemption ought to
be allowed in order to make the parties substantially equal.47
39. Id. at 401.
40. The statute was "neutral" in that, on its face, it did not advance or inhibit
religion or nonreligion, nor was it likely that religious considerations were taken into
account when the statute was passed.
41. One might wonder if denying a benefit is truly being oppressive toward a
religion. But the Court left no doubt in Sherbert; it affirmatively stated that the denial
of an otherwise available public benefit could indeed be considered a burden on the
free exercise of religion. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404, 405. Accord Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205; Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707; Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136.
42. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409, 410.
43. McCarthy gives an example of free exercise that might be more akin to the
problem addressed in Mozert. "For example, a school board might be ordered to
excuse certain students from a secular school activity that interferes with their free
exercise of beliefs, but the school would not be required--or perhaps even allowed-to
ban the activity from the curriculum simply to conform to religious beliefs."
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at 14.
44. Id.
45. Religion, supra note 21, at 1723.
46. Each case is cited supra note 32.
47. Religion, supra note 21, at 1723; TRIBE, supra note 23, at 820, 821. But see
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (Amish employer required to pay social
security tax despite religious tenet that required he and his employees to care for their
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Even so, problems remain in deciding what accommoda-
tions can be made without favoring a particular religion and,
thereby, violating the Establishment Clause." "Some of the
most complex legal questions are raised when students' rights
to attend public school in an environment free from state spon-
sorship of religion are pitted against claims that accommoda-
tions to religious beliefs are required to protect free exercise
rights."49 There is also the difficult task of deciding what
weight to assign to the state's interest, as opposed to the bur-
den on an individual's religious liberty.5° At the heart of each
of these issues is the problem addressed in Mozert.
II. HISTORY OF THE CASE
A. Background
Early in 1983, a textbook selection committee appointed by
the Hawkins County School District recommended the
purchase of the 1983 edition of the Holt, Rinehart, and Win-
ston basic reading series5' for use in grades one through eight
of the county's public schools.52 The committee evaluated sev-
own elderly); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (Air Force regulation
requiring the removal of headgear was upheld against an Orthodox Jew whose religion
required him to wear a yarmulke); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (assigning a
social security number to a Native American Indian girl was upheld despite her
parents' belief that the number would diminish her spiritual power). These cases
contain language that might indicate a departure from the substantive equality and
strict scrutiny of Sherbert, Yoder, and Thomas. Chief Justice Burger stated in Roy that
the burden government must meet to justify intrusion into religious liberty is lower in
cases where the intrusion is a neutral statute that indirectly denies a benefit. Roy, 476
U.S. at 703-06. But in Hobbie, decided a year later, Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court, stated: "Five justices rejected [Chief Justice Burger's] argument in Roy... we
reject the argument again today. As Justice O'Conner pointed out in Roy, '[s]uch a test
has no basis in precedent and relegates a serious First Amendment value to the barest
level of minimal scrutiny that the Equal Protection Clause already provides.'" Hobbie,
480 U.S. at 141-42. The exchange of arguments by the different justices in Roy and
Hobbie indicate that the Free Exercise Clause analysis may be inconsistent if not
unsettled. It certainly indicates that even when the Court has agreed on the proper
standard of review, the members of the Court have disagreed strongly on the weight to
assign to the differing interests of the state and religious adherents. See also Religion,
supra note 21, at 1712.
48. See Religion, supra note 21, at 1667.
49. McCARTHY, supra note 2, at 14.
50. See supra note 47.
51. Subsequently referred to as "Holt series."
52. Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194, 1196 (E.D. Tenn.
1986), rev'd, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988). Because
this Note will frequently cite to both the district court decision and the appellate court
decision in Mozert, the district court decision will be cited as Mozert I and the appellate
court decision as Mozert II.
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eral series of textbooks over a number of months before mak-
ing its recommendation.53 The Hawkins County Board of
Education' unanimously approved the recommendation and
purchased the Holt series for use by teachers and students,
beginning with the 1983 school year.55 But before the first
month of school passed, several conservative Christian families
organized to protest, among other things, the content of the
Holt series.' This group, including most of the parent-plain-
tiffs, spoke at the regularly scheduled School Board meetings
on September 8, October 13, and November 10, 1983, informing
the Board that the Holt series offended their religious beliefs.
The parents then presented petitions requesting removal of the
Holt series from the schools.57
The plaintiffs objected to what they thought were anti-
Christian themes that ran throughout the Holt series. They
objected to themes of feminism, secular humanism, evolution,
false views of death, situation ethics, magic (occultism), rebel-
lion toward parents, and anti-Christian bias.s The complaint
was not that particular stories were offensive, but that the Holt
Series as a whole unduly emphasized the "objectionable"
themes to the point that the parents believed that the series
systematically undermined the values that they were attempt-
ing to instill in their children.59
During the first few months of the school year, principals
and teachers at some of the Hawkins County schools provided
alternative reading arrangements for a number of the stu-
53. Id.
54. Subsequently referred to as "the Board."
55. Mozert 1, 647 F. Supp. at 1196.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. A 212 page document containing a list of the objectionable passages was
submitted to the district court [hereinafter Objectionable Passages]. See infra notes
121, 137.
59. Mozert 1, 647 F. Supp. at 1199; Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1074-75 (Boggs, J.,
concurring); Telephone interview with Rebecca Hagelin, Communications Director for
Concerned Women for America (CWA provided the legal counsel for the plaintiffs in
Mozert) [hereinafter Interview]. See infra notes 121, 137. See also Objectionable
Passages, supra note 58.
It should be noted here as well that the plaintiffs claimed to be content to study
any of the other reading series approved by the state except the Holt series. In fact,
the children read from the former reading series when ad hoc accommodations were
initially made. Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1060. Plaintiffs' counsel claims that they were
even willing to purchase additional texts from the state's approved list and pay for the
tutors to teach their children in a separate setting, if the Board would allow the
proposed accommodation. Interview, supra.
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dents.' One principal refused to make accommodations, which
resulted in a protest by the parents to the Board. Conse-
quently, the Board, in its November 10 meeting, unanimously
adopted a resolution that required that Hawkins County teach-
ers "use only textbooks adopted by the Board of Education as
regular classroom textbooks."'" The school officials, in accord-
ance with the resolution, ceased to provide alternative reading
arrangements for any students. The plaintiff-students then
refused, on religious grounds, to attend the reading classes that
used the Holt series. They were promptly suspended from
school for three days. After refusing to attend classes a second
time, the students were suspended for ten days. At this point
most of the plaintiff-students withdrew from the public schools
and enrolled in private schools.2
B. Decision of the District Court
The District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
found that the students' free exercise rights had indeed been
violated and that the resolution by the Board pressured the
plaintiffs to either violate their religious beliefs or forego the
otherwise available public benefit of free education. 3 The dis-
trict court then considered whether there was a compelling
state interest that might justify the Board's action. It also con-
60. Arrangements varied from child to child. Usually the teacher would assign a
passage from a different reading book and the student would be dismissed to another
room to read. Mozert 1, 647 F. Supp. at 1199. There was no evidence that the ad hoc
accommodations caused any detriment to the student-plaintiffs or the class as a whole.
"In fact, [the student-plaintiffs] still received above average grades for that period." Id.
at 1201, 1202; Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1074.
61. Mozert I, 647 F. Supp. at 1196 n.6 (quoting Joint Stipulation of Fact [Court File
No. 205, at 44]).
62. Id. at 1196, 1197. Before the District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee decided the case in 1986, it first granted summary judgment for the Board,
finding that although the plaintiffs' beliefs were sincere, and although certain passages
in the Holt series may have offended those beliefs, the books appeared neutral on the
subject of religion and therefore did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 579 F. Supp. 201, 202 (E. D. Tenn. 1984). On
appeal from summary judgment, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded the case, instructing the district court to determine: (1) whether the
defendants infringed on the plaintiffs' free exercise rights; (2) whether a compelling
state interest might justify such an infringement; and (3) whether a less restrictive
means could accommodate both parties without violating the Establishment Clause.
Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 765 F.2d at 78 (6th Cir. 1985). After the
decision of the appellate court that is analyzed in this Note, Mozert was subsequently
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. Mozert v. Hawkins
County Public Schools, 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988).
63. Mozert 1, 647 F. Supp. at 1200.
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sidered whether the Board's action was the least restrictive
means of achieving any compelling state interest.64 The court
found that the State had a compelling interest "in the educa-
tion of its young," but that the State could achieve literacy and
good citizenship for all students without forcing them to read
from the Holt series alone.' At the same time, the court con-
cluded that it would not be possible to fashion an alternative
within the context of the public school classroom that would
not unduly burden the school administration and staff. Such a
burden, in the view of the court, would violate the Establish-
ment Clause.' Therefore, the court fashioned a remedy that
required the schools to excuse the objecting students from
reading classes that used the Holt series. The students who
chose this "opt-out" alternative to the reading classes would
then learn reading at home or from a tutor, and their reading
proficiency would continue to be tested by the standardized
achievement tests used by the state.67 The court said that such
a solution was consistent with Tennessee law, which allowed
for total home education. 68
III. DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the deci-
sion of the district court was reversed.69 The three judges who
heard the case, Chief Judge Lively and Circuit Judges Ken-
64. Id. at 1200-01.
65. Id. It was "obvious" to the court that the State interest could be met in other
ways because the State of Tennessee had itself approved a number of other basic
reading series for use in the State's public schools. The State also allowed children to
attend private schools or to be taught at home, thereby affirming the notion that the
State's interest might be accomplished in other ways that give greater deference to
parental interest in a child's upbringing.
66. Id. at 1202-03. For the specifics of the Establishment Clause test, see supra
notes 20-22. The district court stated that "any accommodation of the plaintiffs in the
schools would have the effect of advancing a particular religion and would involve an
excessive entanglement between the state and religion." Id. at 1203. There is some
question whether a judicially created exemption that lifts a burden imposed on free
exercise can truly be in violation of the Establishment Clause. See infra note 299. The
Supreme Court has also recently indicated that it would generally confine application
of the "entanglement" prong of the Lemon test to cases involving government aid to
religious institutions. Strossen, supra note 25, at 360. Therefore, there may be room
for accommodation of the plaintiff-students within the public school system, as was
accomplished before this suit was filed, without violation of the Establishment Clause.
Further discussion of such accommodation will be considered in Part IV of this Note.
67. Mozert I, 647 F. Supp. at 1203.
68. Id.; TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3050 (1987).
69. Mozert II, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
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nedy and Boggs, all agreed in the result, yet each adopted a
different rationale.70 Each rationale represents a distinct con-
stitutional approach to the first amendment question presented
in Mozert. Each approach will be analyzed in depth in Section
IV of this Note.
The issues on appeal were essentially the same as those
considered by the district court: whether the plaintiffs' beliefs
were truly burdened in the constitutional sense, and whether
such a burden could be justified by some overwhelming state
interest.71
Chief Judge Lively, writing for the court, decided the case
on the first issue alone. He found that there was no burden, in
the constitutional sense, on the religious freedom of the plain-
tiffs.2 The Chief Judge framed the issue as one of "expo-
sure.- 73 He found that a government action requiring a person
to be exposed to ideas that he or she finds objectionable cannot
create an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of that
person's religion. 74 He stated that the evil prohibited by the
Free Exercise Clause is "governmental compulsion either to do
or refrain from doing an act forbidden or required by one's
religion. '75  The school children were only required to read
and discuss the stories contained in the Holt series; govern-
ment action requiring mere exposure, without compulsion to
act in some way, could not violate the Free Exercise Clause.76
Chief Judge Lively distinguished a number of Supreme
Court cases, cited by the plaintiffs, in which government action
had violated free exercise rights.77 He observed that in most of
70. Id. Judge Kennedy agreed with the opinions of the court, but wrote a separate
opinion giving an alternative ground upon which the case could be decided.
71. Id. The court of appeals originally asked the district court to consider three
issues: the burden, the possible state interest, and whether a less restrictive
alternative could be found that might still uphold the state interest. See supra note 62.
On appeal, little discussion was given the possibility of a less restrictive alternative,
presumably because two of the three judges concluded that there was no burden on
the plaintiffs' rights. Judge Kennedy, who reached the issue of state interest, briefly
concluded that mandatory reading from the Holt series was the least restrictive
alternative. Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1071.
72. Id. at 1070. Because he found no burden, there was no need to consider the
question of an overwhelming state interest.
73. Id. at 1063.
74. Id. at 1066.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1065-67. The court distinguished the following cases in order: Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (a Seventh-Day Adventist was improperly denied
unemployment benefits after leaving a job that required her to work on her Sabbath);
1989]
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those cases, a constitutional burden was found because there
was governmental compulsion to act or affirm a belief that vio-
lated the plaintiffs' religious convictions.7 Additionally, Judge
Lively noted that public schools play a major role in teaching
fundamental values that are essential to a democratic society.7 9
Among these values is tolerance of opposing religious or polit-
ical ideas. To attempt to eliminate from the schools every
belief that is objectionable to any sect or religion would "leave
public education in shreds."' If the students were not com-
pelled to act in a way that violated their religious beliefs, then
what is involved in Mozert is simply exposure to diverse
beliefs, which, according to Judge Lively, is healthy because it
promotes tolerance.8 L
Judge Kennedy agreed with Chief Judge Lively's analysis,
yet she felt the need to discuss the issue of a compelling state
interest in the required reading program.82 Such an interest,
in her mind, had three components. First, the state had an
interest in developing critical reading skills.8 3 Judge Kennedy
was convinced that critical reading could only be accomplished
by requiring children to study a basal reader, to participate in
class discussion, and to formulate and express their own opin-
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (a Jehovah's Witness was improperly
denied unemployment benefits after quitting a job that required him to work on
military tanks); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 408 U.S. 136
(1987) (a Seventh-Day Adventist was improperly denied unemployment benefits after
being discharged for refusing to work on her Sabbath); Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
488 (1961) (deciding that a state could not require a political candidate to declare a
belief in God); Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (a Jehovah's
Witness, who considered the flag an "image" that the Bible forbids worshiping in any
way, was improperly required to say the pledge of allegiance); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (Old Order Amish children were exempted from public education
beyond the eighth grade because the values taught in high school undermined their
religious beliefs).
78. Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1065, 1066. The only exception to the cases that required
an "action" was Yoder. Justice Lively distinguished Yoder from Mozert in a different
fashion; in Yoder, the exposure to the values taught in high school was a burden
because the religious requirements of the Amish demand that their children be
prepared for life in a separate community. Conversely, in Mozert, the parents want
their children to be prepared for life in modern society.
79. Id. at 1065.
80. Id. at 1069 (quoting McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 235 (1948)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
81. Id. at 1068-70.
82. Id. at 1070.
83. Id. Critical reading, as expounded in Judge Kennedy's opinion, involves
reading and discussing controversial and complex moral and social issues, with the goal
of having the students develop their own ideas and make value judgments about those
subjects.
Freedom of Religion in Public Schools
ions.' Mandatory participation in the reading program
selected by the Board presented the least restrictive way of
carrying out that interest.a5
Second, the state had an interest in avoiding disruption in
the classroomm The subjects discussed in the reader are rein-
forced at every opportunity during the school day." There-
fore, to disturb the critical reading process would be to disturb
the educational process as a whole. To allow students to opt-
out of reading would defeat the state's interest in preserving
the integrity of the classroom."
Third, Judge Kennedy expressed concern that allowing
students to opt-out of class for religious reasons would cause
religious divisiveness.8 9 The school system has a compelling
interest in avoiding this kind of discord.' Additionally, this
disruption would be magnified if the schools were forced to
grant exemptions to other students from other religions. The
opt-out remedy sets a dangerous precedent that could cause
great confusion within the educational system.91 Thus, even if
the court had determined that the students' free exercise
rights had been burdened, Judge Kennedy still would not
allow those students an exemption, for the state's interest in
critical reading, classroom integrity, and freedom from reli-
gious divisiveness would justify the imposition of that burden.92
Judge Boggs concurred with the decision, although he
found no compelling state interest 93 and disagreed with Chief
Judge Lively's rationale. 4 Judge Boggs concluded that the
plaintiffs' complaint was not against any exposure to conflict-
ing religious ideas, but to the overall effect of the Holt Series.95
84. Id. at 1070, 1071.
85. Id. at 1071.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1072.
88. Id.
89. Id. Unfortunately, Judge Kennedy gave no clear explanation of what form
that divisiveness would take or how exactly it might be caused by the plaintiffs' ability
to opt-out.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1072, 1073.
92. Id. at 1073.
93. Id. at 1077.
94. Id. at 1074-76.
95. Id. Judge Boggs went on to say that the plaintiffs are not seeking a school
system or curriculum tailored to their desire, for "they know very well that that is
constitutionally impermissible." Id. at 1075. What they want is exactly what they
asked for- an accommodation allowing them to opt-out or be provided with alternative
reading books, and no more than that.
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The problem, as he saw it, was that the state presented materi-
als that the plaintiffs believed preached religious toleration' of
other religions, as well as humanistic values, by consistent
omission of the plaintiffs' religion and favorable presentation
of opposing views. 7 Judge Boggs was also convinced that the
plaintiffs' views were religious98 and that the reading of the
Holt series was indeed "conduct" contrary to those religious
beliefs.9 Yet, Judge Boggs concluded that even this problem
did not rise to the level of being an unconstitutional burden
upon the students' free exercise rights.10°
Judge Boggs noted that the Supreme Court has "continued
to struggle with the questions of which religious actions are
protected and how significant the burden on that activity must
be in order to trigger the strict scrutiny of the Free Exercise
Clause." '' He concluded that the plaintiffs could not be pro-
tected in this case because the Supreme Court has never
extended the free exercise doctrine to the point of protecting
against the prerogative of school boards to design curricula.10 2
Great deference has traditionally been granted to school
boards because they are politically controlled bodies that are
96. Boggs noted that even Chief Judge Lively's opinion distinguished between
religious tolerance and civil tolerance, the latter being an acceptable value that schools
must teach. 'Thus," Boggs said, "the state may teach that all religions have the same
civil and political rights and must be dealt with civilly in civil society. The state itself
concedes it may not... teach as truth that the religions of others are just as correct as
religions as the plaintiffs' own." Id. at 1080.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1078. There is no contention in Mozert that the plaintiffs' basic beliefs
are not religious. The question of whether a particular belief is or is not religious has
been a difficult issue in numerous first amendment cases and discussions. See
generally id. (brief synopsis of different definitions of "religion" with citations).
99. Id. In Judge Boggs' mind, compelled reading was as much an action as other
compelled conduct that was found in other cases to violate a person's right to freely
exercise his or her religion. Id. at 1075.
100. Id. at 1080, 1081.
101. Id. at 1079.
102. Id. Judge Boggs distinguished Yoder, stating that the religious exercise
protected in that case was more narrow; the Amish mode of life was considered
"essential," "fundamental," and "central" to their religious beliefs and their religious
community would be "gravely endangered if not destroyed" by the requirement to
attend public school beyond the eighth grade. Id. Therefore, in Judge Boggs' mind,
the Amish in Yoder made a greater showing that their religious beliefs were in danger
from government action than did the plaintiffs in Mozert.
Judge Boggs also mentioned West Virginia State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943), as a case in which the Supreme Court might have interfered with a
school board decision. But he distinguished Barnette by noting that "a specific
affirmation was required, implicating a nonreligious first amendment basis as well."
Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1079.
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asked to allocate resources to fulfill the state's goals for educa-
tion as best they can. 03 Therefore, a challenge to the content
of instructional material is a challenge to the notion of a politi-
cally-controlled school system."° Thus, Judge Boggs believed
that the Board's allocations and decisions should not be ques-
tioned, absent a violation of the Establishment Clause: unless
the Board were to establish or promote a particular religion,
the plaintiffs' only remedy in this case is to vote for different
school board officials or to resort to the other options of home
or private schooling.10 5
IV. ANALYSIS AND ALTERNATIVES
The balancing test applied to Free Exercise Clause
claims' 6 suggests some alternative solutions to such cases. If,
as Chief Judge Lively and Judge Boggs maintain, no true bur-
den exists upon the plaintiff's free exercise of religion, the
claim may be dismissed as having no merit. If the state, as
Judge Kennedy suggests, has an overwhelming interest, then a
related government action may be found constitutional despite
any indirect burden it might place upon particular religious
adherents. 107 If a burden has indeed been placed upon a plain-
tiff's free exercise of religion and the state's interest is not
overwhelming, then a remedy should be fashioned that
relieves the claimant from the burden of the government
action. 08 In this section, these alternatives will be analyzed in
the context of the Mozert case.
A. The Question of a Burden Upon the Plaintiffs'
Religious Beliefs
Chief Judge Lively resolved the issue in Mozert by finding
that there was no burden placed by the Board'0 9 upon the
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1079.
105. Id. at 1080, 1081.
106. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
107. E.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
108. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
109. It has long been established that the protections of religious liberty granted
by the first amendment are binding against the states, as well as the federal
government. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); MCCARTHY, supra note
2, at 10. The school board, as an agent of the state government, is similarly restricted
from infringing upon religious liberty.
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plaintiffs' right to freely exercise their religion. 110 The Board's
decision to compel reading from the Holt series did not create
a burden, in Chief Judge Lively's opinion, because the plain-
tiffs were merely exposed to beliefs and values that differed
from their own."' This exposure was not a burden because
the Supreme Court has generally found a burden only when a
person is forced to engage in conduct (as opposed to passive
exposure) that violates his or her religious beliefs, or is forced
to affirm or deny a belief in violation of his or her religion." 2
Chief Judge Lively concluded that compelled reading from the
Holt series was not "conduct" that violated the plaintiffs' reli-
gious beliefs, and that the Board, by compelling the students to
read the Holt series, did not cause the plaintiff-students to
affirm or deny beliefs in violation of their religion.1 3 If his
conclusion is correct, the plaintiffs' claim might properly be
dismissed as having no merit.
However, closer scrutiny of Chief Judge Lively's opinion
reveals two ways in which his analysis does not support his
conclusions. First, compelled reading of objectionable material
might indeed be considered conduct in the plain sense of the
word.114 Second, the Supreme Court, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,115
has allowed a Free Exercise Clause exemption to a facially
neutral educational requirement when the plaintiffs have
shown that exposure to offensive values burdened the practice
of their religion." 6 If the compelled reading is "conduct," or if
exposure can be considered a burden upon one's free exercise
of religion, a "burden" in the constitutional sense was present
in Mozert.
The view that there is no burden in this case because there
is no coerced conduct which runs counter to the plaintiffs' reli-
gious values "slights [the] plaintiffs' honest beliefs [sic] that
studying the full Holt series would be conduct contrary to their
religion and overlooks other Supreme Court Free Exercise
[Clause] cases that view 'conduct' that may offend religious
exercise at least as broadly as do plaintiffs.""' 7
110. Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1059-70 (6th Cir.
1987).
111. Id. at 1063.
112. Id. at 1066.
113. Id. at 1070.
114. See infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
115. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
116. See infra notes 151-73 and accompanying text.
117. Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1075 (Boggs, J., concurring).
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There is no doubt that the reading of particular material
can be conduct prohibited by religious beliefs. The viewing or
reading of pornographic material would probably be considered
a "sin" by many orthodox religions. There is no specific Bibli-
cal mandate against reading pornography, and yet such con-
duct is proscribed because there is the natural danger that the
reader will think impure thoughts or adopt impure attitudes.
This is not to say that the Holt series is the equivalent of
pornography from the plaintiffs' viewpoint.11 The point is
made simply to demonstrate that the reading of certain mate-
rial can be conduct 1 9 prohibited by a particular religion. How-
ever, Chief Judge Lively's opinion is that the reading of
educational material like the Holt series cannot be conduct
that burdens an individual's free exercise of religion. His
rationale lies in his broad view of the plaintiffs' complaint.
Chief Judge Lively's view is that the plaintiffs are
objecting to any teaching or reading about views that are con-
trary to their own. 2 ° The Chief Judge points to a number of
the plaintiffs' objections in order to emphasize the difficulty of
finding contemporary material that would not offend the plain-
tiffs' religious beliefs. 12  He concludes that "the plaintiff-par-
118. Although some of the same concerns are present. Even a passive reading of
explicit material is perceived by Christians to affect the values and attitudes of the
individual. Likewise, these Christians fear that a continued reading of material laden
with values contrary to those of Christianity would have a similarly negative effect on
their children's values and attitudes.
119. At one point even Chief Judge Lively seems to concede that reading is indeed
conduct. He said, "[t]he only conduct compelled by the defendants was reading and
discussing the material in the Holt series." Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1069 (emphasis
added).
120. Id. at 1062, 1063.
121, Id. Chief Judge Lively chose the following unremarkable examples to
illustrate the type of information to which the plaintiffs object: a passage that
describes Leonardo da Vinci as a man with a creative mind that came "closest to the
divine touch" was objectionable because it taught "Man as God"; a passage called
"Seeing Beneath the Surface" was objectionable because it described an occult theme
of using the imagination to see things not discernible with the naked eye; and "A Visit
to Mars" was objectionable because it portrayed telepathy in such a way that it might
be considered a scientific concept and repugnant to their religious beliefs. Id.
By focusing on the above objections, Chief Judge Lively makes the plaintiffs'
position appear to be quite difficult to accommodate; the objections stem from what
most people would consider an "extreme" viewpoint, suggesting that there may not be
any public school reading series that would not be objectionable to the plaintiffs.
Moreover, Chief Judge Lively's opinion ignores the plaintiffs' more traditional
fundamentalist concerns. The plaintiffs found 31 stories that depicted children
rebelling against their parents, and sometimes against the government, without
negative consequences; they found 87 stories that promoted feminism; they also found
47 stories portraying non-Christian religion in some significant fashion, while there
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ents objected to passages that expose their children to other
forms of religion and to the feelings, attitudes and values of
other students that contradict the plaintiffs' religious views
without a statement that the other views are incorrect and that
the plaintiffs' views are the correct ones."'122 If this were true,
the case would become, as Judge Boggs said, "most uninterest-
ing," and could be "simply resolved," for any statements to the
effect that one particular religion is correct are obviously viola-
tive of the Establishment Clause. 1' The court does not pre-
tend to decide this case on such an extreme view of the
plaintiffs' claim, 2 4 yet such a view no doubt contributes to
Chief Judge Lively's conclusion that this is merely a case about
exposure. 2 5
Admittedly, exposure is the issue in this case. But the
exposure involved is much greater than the court perceives. It
is a repeated exposure12 to a captive audience" of grade
school children,'28 a series of exposures that reinforce and
build upon one another"2 throughout the series without any
significant counterbalancing from what the plaintiff-parents
perceive to be the Biblically correct point of view."s The par-
ents fear that such exposure becomes indoctrination.''
Chief Judge Lively conceded that the plaintiffs' complaint
concerns the repeated exposure to objectionable material, 32
yet he made very little of that point. The plaintiff-parents,
however, based their entire claim upon the reinforced expo-
sure; the plaintiffs were said to object to the Holt series "as a
whole,"' 33 to "the overall effect,"'" to the "degree" of expo-
sure, 3 5 and to the exposure "in the context of the Holt
was no representation of Protestant Christianity anywhere in the series. Objectionable
Passages, supra note 58. See supra notes 58, 59 and accompanying text.
122. Mozert I1, 827 F.2d at 1062.
123. Id. at 1074.
124. Id. at 1070.
125. Id. at 1063.
126. See infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
128. In this case, first through eighth grade children, whom the courts recognize
to be highly impressionable. See infua notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
129. Mozert I, 647 F. Supp. at 1199.
130. Objectionable Passages, supra note 58; see Mozert 1, 647 F. Supp. at 1199;
Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1064, 1075.
131. See infra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
132. Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1063.
133. Id. at 1062.
134. Id. at 1074.
135. Mozert I, 647 F. Supp. at 1199.
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series,"'136 all clear indications that the parents were objecting
to the reinforced exposure. Furthermore, the district court 37
and Judge Boggs"m also recognized the repeated nature of the
exposure as the key to the plaintiffs' complaint.
Many have expressed a valid concern over reinforced
exposure to beliefs contrary to a child's religion. Public school
students are, by virtue of mandatory attendance, a captive
audience'3 9 and cannot refuse to receive information that is
disseminated to them.140 Additionally, grade school students
are highly impressionable and easily influenced.14 1  In first
amendment cases, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recog-
nized that captive audience members, especially vulnerable
school children,"4 have a particular interest in avoiding offen-
136. Id.
137. Id. Judge Hull wrote the following.
It appears to the Court that many of the objectionable passages in the Holt
books would be rendered inoffensive, or less offensive, in a more balanced
context. The problem with the Holt series, as it relates to the plaintiffs'
beliefs, is one of degree. One story reinforces and builds upon the others
throughout the individual texts and the series as a whole. The plaintiffs
believe that, after reading the entire Holt series, a child might adopt the views
of a feminist, a humanist, a pacifist, an anti-Christian, a vegetarian, or an
advocate of a "one-world government."
Id.
138. Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1074.
139. Strossen, supra note 25, at 389.
140. B. Freeman, The Supreme Court and First Amendment Rights of Students in
the Public Classroom, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 20 (1984) [hereinafter Freeman].
141. Strossen, supra note 25, at 370; Religion, supra note 21, at 1660.
142. It is not just school children, but children in general, who are especially
vulnerable to influence from peers and authority figures. The complaint in Mozert had
a great deal to do with the age of the student-plaintiffs. The Supreme Court has
recognized that captive audiences should not be subjected to offensive material and
that children, because of their immaturity, are more susceptible than adults to
indoctrination because a child "is not possessed of that full capacity for individual
choice which is the presupposition for First Amendment guarantees." FCC v. Patricia
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 758 (1978).
One commentator cites sociologists and social psychologists who conclude that
children have a strong "urge to conform to their classmates' attitudes." Choper,
Religion in the Public School&- A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN. L. REv.
329, 343-44 (1963) [hereinafter Choper]. For the minority religious adherent, this may
mean an urge to conform to beliefs unacceptable to the adherent's parents. Choper
also states that students are "far less mature and intellectually developed than the
public generally, since they are particularly unable to evaluate conflicting religious
beliefs objectively, since they are especially susceptible to being influenced in religious
choice." Id. at 337.
Some critics of public schooling maintain that the school's power to mold a child's
belief is so overwhelming that it can only be diminished by a radical restructuring of
the public school system.
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sive information. 43 Children often do not possess a realistic
freedom of choice, due to their inability to fully appreciate and
assess information.'" They also are likely to perceive religious
or antireligious content in curricular materials as expressing
the approval or disapproval of the school authorities.145 Thus,
these children feel pressure from teachers and peers to either
conform to majority practice and belief or face alienation due
to their nonconformity.'46
The above information suggests that children do not have
the pure ability to weigh conflicting value systems and objec-
tively choose which one is correct or appropriate for their lives;
their values are highly influenced by peers, parents, and other
authority figures or role models.14' Therefore, some believe
that public schools should not be allowed to teach children val-
ues that are inconsistent with those of their parents,14 for the
manner in which a child is to be raised is the province of the
child's parents, not the state.149
The repeated exposure in the Holt series to values incon-
sistent with the plaintiff-parents' beliefs makes this more than
a case about simple exposure. Because children are impres-
sionable, and because the perceived "negative" values are rein-
forced, the parents legitimately fear that their children may
not adopt the religious values that the parents are attempting
to instill. Since, in the plaintiffs' view, the Holt series contains
a great amount of material that is laden with values contrary
143. Strossen, supra note 25, at 369; Religion, supra note 21, at 1660.
144. Freeman, supra note 140, at 29, 30.
145. Strossen, supra note 25, at 359; Religion, supra note 21, at 1660.
146. Religion, supra note 21, at 1660.
147. A reading series like the Holt series can be a great influence upon a child's
value system. McGuFFEY's ECLECTIC READERS was a reading series written by a
Protestant minister, William McGuffey. The series was used extensively from 1836 to
1920. One educational commentator estimated that as many as half of the American
students during that period "drew their inspiration and formulated their codes of
morals and conduct from this remarkable set of Readers." McCARTHY, supra note 2, at
7 (quoting E. CUBBERLY, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY AND
INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL HISTORY 294 (1934)).
148. See Hirschoff, Parents and the Public School Curriculum: Is There a Right to
Have One's Child Excused from Objectionable Instruction?, 50 So. CALIF. L. REv. 871,
957 (1977) (parents should have a right to have their children excused from public
school instruction that conflicts with parental values; children's potential
indoctrination in values inconsistent with those of their parents violates the first
amendment's protection of freedom of speech, freedom of thought, and the American
idea of consent of the governed.) It follows that when religious values are involved,
the teaching of values inconsistent with parental values also violates the free exercise
of religion.
149. Id. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14. (1972).
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to those of Christianity,"5 to compel the plaintiff-students to
read the Holt series is to compel conduct contrary to their reli-
gious beliefs. However, even if the compelled reading of the
Holt series is not considered conduct in the strict sense of the
word, plaintiffs such as those in Mozert might still have a
claim.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the United States Supreme Court
held that exposure to values contrary to one's religious beliefs,
in a public school context, can be a burden upon a person's free
exercise rights.15 ' Chief Judge Lively attempts to distinguish
Yoder by claiming that the holding in Yoder is too narrow to
encompass a complaint such as the one in Mozert.152 Yet, much
of the rationale in Yoder applies to Mozert as well.
In Yoder, Old Order Amish school children were allowed
an exemption from a Wisconsin law that required children to
attend public school until at least age sixteen.'5 The Amish
refused to send their children to public school beyond the
eighth grade because they claimed that high school emphasizes
values that are at variance with the Amish religion"M and that
alienate man from God. 55 The Amish did allow their children
to attend grades one through eight, since in those grades the
children learned necessary skills such as the "three R's," how
150. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. It should be noted that if the Holt
series contained a balanced presentation of Christian values alongside of the other
values that it presents, the plaintiffs would probably have no claim. Mozert Ir, 827 F.2d
at 1064. Such a balanced presentation would more closely resemble "simple exposure."
The children would then have the opportunity to consider the opposing views and
choose for themselves the correct position. The opportunity to choose is fairly
meaningless because these children still do not have the ability to objectively assess
conflicting values and choose those that are correct for them. See supra notes 139-47
and accompanying text. Yet, in a balanced situation the likelihood that the children
will perceive the school to be disapproving of their religious beliefs is greatly
diminished.
However, Chief Judge Lively aptly presents the problems of attempting to balance
the religious content in a reading course. Mozert 11, 827 F.2d at 1064-65. First, tailoring
a public school's curriculum so that it satisfies the demands and prohibitions of a
particular religion would no doubt violate the Establishment Clause. Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968). Second, balance is a matter of perspective. Once the
material has been altered to satisfy one religious position, a second group might then
complain that the balance slighted their position. Mozert 11, 827 F.2d at 1065.
151. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
152. Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1067.
153. 406 U.S. at 207.
154. Those impermissible values included intellectual and scientific
accomplishments, self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with
other non-Amish students.
155. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 211-12.
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to be good citizens, and how to deal with the non-Amish.156
However, by sending their children to high school, the Amish
parents felt that they would be allowing an impermissible
exposure to worldly influence.l 7 Such action would risk cen-
sure from their church and endanger the salvation of both
their children and themselves." s The Court recognized that
the Amish, by virtue of the mandatory attendance statute,
would be forced to either abandon their belief and be assimi-
lated into society, or face criminal punishment for
noncompliance.15 9
The plaintiffs' complaint in Mozert is quite similar to the
complaint of the Amish in Yoder. In both cases, the plaintiffs
objected to exposure to the values emphasized by public educa-
tion.' 60 In each case, the values that were emphasized tended
to undermine the faith of the plaintiffs. The Amish thought
that high school emphasized values that would endanger their
childrens' desires to live in a separate agrarian society,' 6 ' while
the plaintiffs in Mozert thought that the anti-Christian bias of
the Holt series would endanger their childrens' desire to
become Christians.162
In Yoder, the Court observed that the religion of the
Amish was more than just a belief in a deity. It was a faith
that pervaded and determined their entire way of life."a
Therefore, to undermine their religious values was to under-
mine their entire lifestyle.164 A similar observation applies to
the plaintiffs in Mozert. The religious beliefs of a conservative
Christian are more than just a belief in God. It is a faith that
demands obedience to Him in all things; it is a faith that per-
vades and determines an entire way of life.1"a
Chief Judge Lively distinguished Yoder from Mozert by
noting that, in Yoder, the parents wanted their children to pre-
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 209. A central tenet of the Amish faith is that in order to be saved from
damnation, one must live in a church community, separate and apart from the world
and its influence. To risk censure by the church is to risk one's salvation. Id.
159. Id. at 218.
160. In neither case were the objectionable values overtly taught as truth. In each
case the values were emphasized by either repetitive presentation in the curriculum,
or by the very setting in which the curriculum was taught.
161. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 211.
162. 647 F.Supp. at 1199.
163. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216-17.
164. Id.
165. See supra note 6.
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pare for life in a separate community, while in Mozert, the
plaintiff-parents wanted their children to be prepared for life
in the modern world." This distinction seems obvious
enough, yet it demonstrates a lack of understanding of con-
servative Christian beliefs.
The Amish in Yoder and the conservative Christians in
Mozert both derive their religious direction from the same
book, the Holy Bible. Thus, both have the same command to
"be separate" from the rest of the world.167 The Amish under-
stand this command to require physical separation. As a
result, they live in communities that are separate from the
modern world and they avoid contact with the people and life-
styles of modern society whenever possible.16 The Christian
understands the same command to require something other
than physical separation.169 The separation required is a dis-
tinct lifestyle; the Christian should act,170 talk,' 71 and even
think 72 differently than the rest of society. Moreover, his or
her values ought to be based on "eternal" concerns rather than
on those that are important only for this lifetime.'73
Based on the above considerations, Chief Judge Lively's
distinguishing of Yoder from Mozert appears superficial. The
Christians in Mozert have an identical duty to remain separate
from society by maintaining values distinct from those of soci-
166. Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1067.
167. 2 Corinthians 6:14-18 reads:
Do not be yoked together with unbelievers. For what do righteousness and
wickedness have in common? Or what fellowship can light have with
darkness? What harmony is there between Christ and Belial? What does a
believer have in common with an unbeliever? Therefore come out from them
and be separate, says the Lord. Touch no unclean thing and I will receive you.
I will be a Father to you and you will be my sons and daughters, says the Lord
Almighty.
(All Biblical references in this Note are taken from the New International Version.)
168. Mozert Ir, 827 F.2d at 1067.
169. In the conservative Christian's view, the command to be separate cannot
require physical separation because there are other commands requiring Christians to
communicate the message of Jesus Christ to all who do not believe. See, e.g., Matthew
28:19-20 ('"Therefore go and make disciples of all nations"); Romans 10:14-15 ("And
how can they hear without someone preaching to them?"); 2 Cornthians 5:20 ("We are
therefore Christ's ambassadors").
170. See, e.g., Ephesians 2:1, 4:1-6:9; Galatians 5:19-24.
171. See, e.g., Ephesians 4:29, 5:4.
172. See, e.g., Romans 12:2.
173. See, e.g., Colossians 3:2; 2 Corinthians 4:18 ("So we fix our eyes not on what is
seen, but what is unseen. For what is seen is temporary, but what is unseen is
eternal.") Therefore many of the values that are repugnant to the Amish are also
repugnant to the conservative Christian. See supra note 154.
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ety. In fact, the duty facing the Christians is conceivably
greater in that they must remain distinct while living within
contemporary society. Consequently, the plaintiff-students'
need to avoid influential exposure to impermissible values
might be greater as well.'74 Thus, there is a very real threat
that compelled exposure to values contrary to the Christians'
beliefs will undermine their faith, despite the Chief Judge's
claim to the contrary.175
Chief Judge Lively's distinctions aside, the key factor that
remains from a comparison of Mozert with Yoder is that in
Yoder the Supreme Court found a burden upon the free exer-
cise of the Amish faith because the Amish were exposed to
opposing values. 76 The Amish students were not compelled to
"declare a belief [in]" or communicate their acceptance of the
values presented, nor were they forced to engage in any other
type of activity that Chief Judge Lively would find necessary
to sustain a claim under the Free Exercise Clause. 7 7 Instead,
the Court found the requisite coercive effect' 78 to exist if the
government merely required the Amish to attend school in an
atmosphere in which they would be exposed to opposing values
that the Amish perceived to be emphasized to the detriment of
their own religious values.
It is not difficult to see the similarity 79 between that coer-
cive effect and the compelled reading of the Holt series in
174. But it might be argued that if the Christians' need to avoid influential
exposure is so great then perhaps they should opt-out of the entire curriculum, as did
the Amish. For the Mozert plaintiffs, such a remedy would be no accommodation at
all; Tennessee law already allows parents to send their children to private school or
home school. In fact, removing the children completely from public school is exactly
what the plaintiffs are trying to avoid, for it would force them to pay for private
education. Mozert 1, 647 F. Supp. at 1200. Moreover, the plaintiffs are not claiming
that the public schools as a whole impermissibly emphasize values contrary to their
religious beliefs, as did the Amish. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 211. They instead object only to
the impermissible emphasis of opposing values in a particular reading series, in a
particular subject. Mozert 1, 647 F. Supp. at 1201.
175. Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1067.
176. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 211.
177. Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1066. Chief Judge Lively states that "governmental
compulsion to do or refrain from doing an act forbidden or required by one's religion,
or to affirm or disavow a belief forbidden or required by one's religion, is the evil
prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause." Id.
178. "It is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of
the [government action] as it operates against him in the practice of his religion."
Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1066 (quoting Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
223 (1963)).
179. There are, of course, some distinctions between Mozert and Yoder. The
children in Yoder were in high school and they were excused from school completely.
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Mozert. The plaintiffs in Mozert objected to a government
action that required them to learn reading from a book that
would expose them to opposing values that they perceived to
be emphasized to the detriment of their own religious values.
Thus, to allow the Mozert plaintiffs an exemption from
reading the Holt series would be a logical extension of the
Supreme Court's rationale allowing the Amish an exemption
from a mandatory attendance requirement that burdened their
free exercise of religion by exposing them to opposing values.
Such an exemption ought to be made for the plaintiffs in
Mozert, unless that exemption would contravene some over-
whelming state interest.18°
None of the above is to suggest that the Hawkins County
Public Schools are teaching inappropriate values, or that they
are indoctrinating children in any particular religion or nonre-
ligion. If that were true, there would be a clear Establishment
Clause violation. The contention in Mozert, as it was in Yoder,
is that the Board decision, which was, in the main, a fair and
legal decision, operated in a burdensome fashion upon the par-
ticular plaintiffs because it compelled them to take a course of
action, whether by study or by attendance, that they believed
undermined their sincere religious beliefs. This is, therefore, a
classic Free Exercise Clause case. If a burden is found upon
the plaintiffs' free exercise of their religion, an exemption
from the burdensome requirement is appropriate.' 8 '
Chief Judge Lively concludes that there was no burden
placed upon the plaintiffs in Mozert for there was no com-
pelled conduct that violated the plaintiffs' beliefs; the plaintiffs
Nevertheless, these distinctions do not preclude an accommodation for the Mozert
plaintiffs.
The fact that the Mozert children were younger suggests that they need
heightened protection from "negative" information. Moreover, because the students
were younger, they could not be excused from the requirement of school altogether as
were the students in Yoder, since they still needed a basic education. Thus, the
plaintiffs were forced to bear the cost of alternative education or bear the burden
imposed on them by the Holt series.
It is not possible to conclude that the only remedy available to the plaintiffs in
Mozert is total removal from school, as allowed in Yoder, since the circumstances are
distinct and the Court in Yoder never considered the problems that might have arisen
had the students been younger and had they objected to only one subject in particular,
as was the case in Mozert. See supra note 174.
180. See infra notes 182-88 and accompanying text.
181. Again, the appropriate remedy for an Establishment Clause violation is an
elimination of the unconstitutional activity. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying
text. The appropriate remedy for a Free Exercise Clause violation is to allow an
exception for the burdened party. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
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were merely exposed to objectionable material which by itself
was insufficient to substantiate a Free Exercise Clause claim.
But Chief Judge Lively ignores the fact that reading offensive
material can be conduct proscribed by religious beliefs. Based
on the vulnerability of the plaintiff-students and upon the
repeated nature of the exposure to objectionable values, a bur-
den should be found upon the free exercise of the plaintiffs'
religion. Consequently, their claim should not have been dis-
missed as having no merit, and the question of an overwhelm-
ing state interest should have been properly addressed.
B. The Question of Compelling State Interest
Not all burdens placed upon religious beliefs by govern-
ment action are unconstitutional."8 2 As the second prong of
the Free Exercise Clause test' 3 suggests, there are instances
when a compelling state interest may justify the burden
imposed upon an individual's religious beliefs.184 In order for
a state's interest to justify uniform enforcement of a regulation
that burdens a person's Free Exercise rights, the interest must
meet a very high standard: it must be "compelling,"'l  "over-
riding,"'1  "of the highest order,' 8 7  or "especiallyimportant.'118
Judge Kennedy, in her concurring opinion, maintains that
the state has a compelling interest in Mozert. s9 Her opinion
embodies a second rationale that may be used in deciding free
exercise cases such as Mozert: the state interest at stake is so
important that the questioned regulation must stand without
exemptions.
There is some question as to what exactly is the state's
interest in Mozert. The district court framed the interest as an
"interest in the education of its young,""' whereas Judge Ken-
nedy perceived the interest to be that of teaching "critical
reading,"'' and avoiding disruption and religious divisiveness
182. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
183. If a burden is found, is that burden justified by some compelling state
interest? See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
184. E.g., Lee, 455 U.S. 252.
185. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
186. Lee, 455 U.S. at 258.
187. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
188. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 723 (1986).
189. 827 F.2d at 1070.
190. 647 F. Supp. at 1200.
191. 827 F.2d at 1070-71.
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in the classroom. 192 But no matter how the state interest is
framed, it is apparent that it may not justify the burden placed
upon the plaintiffs' free exercise rights.
The original notion that the state's compelling interest was
the education of its young was easily overcome by the district
court.193 The district court did not decide that the state's inter-
est in educating its young was not overwhelming, but simply
observed that it could be met in a less restrictive or alternative
fashion.' 94 The court decided that literacy and good citizenship
for all students could be achieved by some means other than
the exclusive reading of the Holt series.195 The state, itself, by
its educational statutes, admits as much.196 Tennessee law
allows students to meet the state's mandatory education
requirements by attending a public school, a private school, or
a home school. 97 The state legislature has also approved a
number of basic reading series for use in the public schools. 9 ,
These factors alone say a great deal concerning the expendabil-
ity of a particular series of reading books and the necessity
that reading be taught in one particular fashion.' 9 Thus, the
Tennessee Legislature is convinced that a proper education
may take place in some place other than the Hawkins County
Public Schools and that it can take place by reading a basic
reading series other than the Holt series.
Judge Kennedy's perceived state interest in teaching criti-
cal reading is narrower and therefore more difficult to brush
aside.2  However, the rationale used by the district court has
some relevance here as well. Judge Kennedy noted that sev-
eral witnesses testified that the only way to achieve critical
reading "is to have the children read a basal reader, participate
in class discussions, and formulate and express their own ideas
and opinions about the materials presented in the basal
192. Id. at 1071-72.
193. Mozert 1, 647 F. Supp. at 1200-02.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1201.
197. Id.; TENN. CODE ANN. § § 49-6-3001, 3050 (1987).
198. 647 F. Supp. at 1201; Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1063; TENN. CODE ANN. § § 49-6-
3001, 3050.
199. Mozert 1, 647 F. Supp. at 1201.
200. It is more difficult to simply conclude that critical reading is taking place in
the private school or in the home. This is due in large part to the fact that success at
critical reading is both difficult to define and to measure. Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1077.
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reader.'201 The Board's expert witness on the teaching of read-
ing also stated that it would be nearly impossible to teach criti-
cal reading consistent with the plaintiffs' religious beliefs.20 2
The notion seems to be that critical reading can only take place
within the state's public classrooms. °3 If critical reading is a
compelling state interest, and if it can only occur in the state's
public classrooms, then it follows that either the state should
not statutorily sanction private and home education, or that
critical reading is not as compelling as the defendants
maintain.
The state's expert testified that "it is very difficult to mea-
sure evaluative and critical reading.... 2 4 This is significant
because the facts of the case indicate that the plaintiff-students
scored higher than the average student on the state's standard-
ized reading tests during the time that the plaintiffs were
accommodated with alternative texts.0 5 Yet, even though a
student tested above average, the state's expert maintained
that "it would be very difficult to know if that youngster is
making adequate progress. ''12 1 As Judge Boggs aptly notes, "It
seems to me to be extremely difficult, not to say unfair, to rest
a compelling state interest on the asserted failure of plaintiffs
to learn something which defendants are apparently unable to
define and unwilling to test for."'
The state also has an interest in avoiding disruption in the
classroom.208 As Judge Kennedy notes, the remedy of opting
out could be disruptive since it removes students from a core
subject each day.2°9 Also, information from the reading series
is reinforced, when possible, throughout the school day. 1 Yet
this interest seems uncompelling as well for a number of
reasons.
201. Id. at 1070-71.
202. Id. at 1077.
203. Judge Boggs notes that the Board's view appears to be that "if we are
teaching it in the state classrooms, critical reading must be happening, but if the
plaintiffs are learning reading outside the class (and testing as well as, or better than,
the average student), it must not be happening." Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.; Mozert 1, 647 F. Supp. at 1201.
206. Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1077.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1071.
209. Id. at 1072. This problem is magnified by the fact that in first through fourth
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First, there was no evidence at trial that the initial accom-
modations caused any substantial disruptions.2 ' Surely if
there had been some evidence of negative effects the Board
would have presented it.212 Second, expert educators testified
that the teaching of reading is often carried out through indi-
vidualized instruction.1 3 This strongly suggests that there are,
by necessity, students who daily read different materials than
other students in the same classroom. Therefore, it would be
no more difficult to reinforce material from the reading of the
plaintiff-students than it would be for those already reading
different sections or alternative materials.214 Third, the type of
reinforcement that Judge Kennedy suggests the plaintiffs will
lose by opting out may be the same type of "exposure" that the
plaintiffs seek to avoid. It is true that the plaintiff-students
may still be exposed to objectionable subjects within other
parts of the grade school curriculum. 5 However, without the
emphasis placed by the Holt series upon those subjects or val-
ues, any exposure to those objectionable subjects becomes less
burdensome because the weight of reinforcement is missing.21 6
211. Id. at 1074; Mozert I, 647 F. Supp. at 1201.
212. Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1074.
213. Mozert 1, 647 F. Supp. at 1201. The district court noted:
Mrs. Evelyn Rodriguez, who has taught elementary school in Hawkins County
for ten or eleven years, testified that she not only divides her reading class
into two or three groups by reading level, but that she always uses additional
texts and materials other than the basic reader. As much as possible she
works with the students on their individual reading level, particularly if a
child is below grade level in reading skills. In addition, children requiring
special instruction in reading leave the classroom during the reading period
and go to a reading lab.
Ik at 1201 (emphasis added).
214. In the alternative, if the additional materials used by other students receiving
individualized instruction are not being reinforced throughout the day, then the
plaintiff-students are at no greater disadvantage than those others in the class reading
alternative material.
215. It might also be true that very few of the objectionable subjects or values, see
supra note 121, emphasized by the Holt series, will actually be reinforced in other
subject areas.
216. Again, the plaintiffs testified that "an occasional reference to role reversal,
pacifism, rebellion against parents, one-world government and other objectionable
concepts would be acceptable," but that it was the continual, repetitive nature of the
exposure that the plaintiffs found burdensome. Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1064. The
plaintiffs apparently saw no need for withdrawal from the remainder of the
curriculum. The district court noted:
It is true that many of plaintiffs' objections suggest that other elements of the
curriculum besides the reading program could easily be considered offensive
to their beliefs. However . .. it is the Court's perception that the plaintiffs
have drawn a line in regard to their religiously mandated action. The Holt
series is on one side of the line as intolerable, and apparently the balance of
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Thus, the state's interest in avoiding class disruption would not
be violated by accommodating the plaintiffs.
Judge Kennedy suggests that the state interest in avoiding
religious divisiveness would be hindered by allowing the plain-
tiff-students to opt-out." 7 Avoiding religious divisiveness may
well be a paramount state interest, but Judge Kennedy gives
no evidence that the remedy of opting out would be divisive,
other than her unsubstantiated personal opinion."' Con-
versely, the district court considered that allowing the students
to opt-out might impress upon all students the importance that
our system places upon religious freedom, and thereby "pro-
mote a spirit of religious tolerance. 2 19  Both opinions are
equally worthy assessments of the situation. If learned individ-
uals can differ so greatly in their opinion regarding the effect
of this accommodation, can it be so divisive as to warrant
suppression?
Judge Kennedy was also concerned that allowing an
exemption for the plaintiffs in Mozert might open the gates to
a flood of religious objectors demanding exemptions from cur-
ricular materials on similar grounds.220 While this is a very
legitimate concern, such a scenario seems unlikely for a
number of reasons.221
First, the accommodation of an opt-out remedy places a
great responsibility on the parents of a student who takes
advantage of the remedy. By having their child removed from
the reading program of the public school, the parents would
essentially be agreeing to furnish that part of the child's educa-
tion at home or through the services of a tutor.222 Therefore,
only those willing to spend the time or to pay for individual-
ized instruction will bother to make such a challenge.
Second, there still must be a showing that the curricular
material in question serves to undermine that particular plain-
the books and school curriculum remain, at this point, on the other side of the
line. The plaintiffs have not made multi-subject, multi-text objections; they
have objected to the Holt reading series. The defendants may not justify
burdening the plaintiffs' free exercise rights in this narrow case on the basis
of what the plaintiffs might find objectionable in the future.
647 F. Supp. at 1201.
217. Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1072.
218. Id.
219. Mozert I, 647 F. Supp. at 1202.
220. 827 F.2d at 1072-73.
221. Mozert I, 647 F. Supp. at 1202.
222. See id. at 1203.
[Vol. 12:405
Freedom of Religion in Public Schools
tiff's religious beliefs. This Note does not suggest that the
standard for demonstrating a burden upon one's religious
beliefs should be different than the standard previously
announced by the Supreme Court. It instead suggests that the
appellate court neglected to consider a major factor when
deciding whether a particular curricular emphasis undermined
the plaintiffs' religious beliefs: the sensibility and impressiona-
bility of grade school children. Nevertheless, a burden must
still be shown. The court should not attempt to define the cor-
rect view of the plaintiffs' religion,"2 but it must look for sub-
stantial evidence which demonstrates that some government
action indeed discourages the practice of the plaintiffs' reli-
gion.224 In Mozert, the plaintiffs made a substantial showing.
"The plaintiffs provided voluminous testimony of the conflict
they perceived between reading the Holt readers and their reli-
gious beliefs, including extensive Scriptural references."' In
most cases, such a showing will not be easy and will discourage
many who might challenge particular curricular decisions.
Third, court decisions in favor of plaintiffs like those in
Mozert will cause school boards to perform their duties more
responsibly. Since board members are elected officials that
supposedly represent their constituency, it is unlikely that any
majority of parents will have substantial objections to curricu-
lar decisions. Even so, it would be in the school board's best
interest to attempt to also satisfy minority religious groups
when selecting a curriculum. Therefore, in an effort to avoid
controversy, most school boards will choose textbooks that are
the most satisfactory to their constituency.226 This type of sen-
sitive decision making will curb any rash of curricular related
suits.
Fourth, since school boards will be choosing books more
carefully, publishers will themselves begin editing their books
more closely, avoiding any particular bias.22 7 Some call this
223. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
224. Strossen, supra note 25, at 385.
225. Mozert 11, 827 F.2d at 1076.
226. It was noted, asupra note 150 and accompanying text, that an attempt to
balance the textbooks to make them more pleasing to a particular sect would be futile
as well as violative of the Establishment Clause. Yet there is nothing that prohibits or
discourages a school board from choosing textbooks that are more "balanced." Such a
choice appears to have existed in Mozert. See supra note 59.
227. The editors of the Holt series made extensive changes following the
complaint in Mozert, eliminating some of the material that the plaintiffs found
offensive. See Higher Law, supra note 6, at 460 n.137.
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"self-censorship 2 8 and perceive it as detrimental to educa-
tion,22 but it need not be so. Material that may be controver-
sial should simply be balanced 230 with opposing views or, if
such balance is impractical or illusory, the material should
scrupulously be presented as theory.23 ' In some instances
there may need to be some re-evaluation of whether certain
topics are proper for younger children. 2
The above factors, working together, will prevent objec-
tions like those in Mozert from getting out of hand. Addition-
ally, as the district court noted:
While the Court must be sensitive to the widespread implica-
tions of its decisions, it must also limit its decisions to the
facts of the case before it. Bender v. Williamsport Area
School District, 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986). The case before the
court is a narrow one. The plaintiffs are objecting, on reli-
gious grounds, to the mandated use of the Holt series in the
Hawkins County Public Schools.23 3
Undue speculation, about the effects that this case might have,
should not preclude the granting of an exemption if a burden
has been shown.
The test for finding a compelling state interest is a strict
one. The Court in Sherbert v. Verner said, "In this highly sen-
sitive constitutional area only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation
[of religious freedom]. ' '23 Both the facts and opinions in
Mozert, along with the State of Tennessee's willingness to sanc-
tion alternative education, suggest that "critical reading" does
not rise to a level of a "paramount" state interest. Moreover,
228. Id. at 460.
229. Id. See Strossen, supra note 25, at 1072.
230. Again, attempting to balance the religious or nonreligious material in
textbooks is something in which the state should not engage itself. But the editors of
the books are certainly encouraged to attempt to balance their presentation of
controversial material.
231. For example, though the Holt series contained a disclaimer stating that
evolution was a theory, the plaintiffs contended that the references to evolution were
so prevalent and of such a factual nature that they rendered the disclaimer worthless.
Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1062.
232. Perhaps the publishers ought to reconsider whether stories regarding
disobedience to parents without negative consequences is proper reading for third
grade students. See Objectionable Passages, supra note 58, at 3-4 (child acts against
mother's advice in order to gain first hand experience) (child runs away from home
and rather than being afraid he has a "happy afternoon, playing in the park").
233. Mozert I, 647 F. Supp. at 1202.
234. 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1952)).
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there was little or no proof that critical reading could not take
place outside of the Hawkins County public school classrooms.
Therefore, the Board's expressed desire for critical reading
should not be considered a state interest that would preclude
an exemption for the plaintiffs in Mozert.
There are compelling state interests at issue in Mozert; the
state has an interest in the education of its young, in avoiding
disruption in the classroom, and in avoiding religious divisive-
ness. Yet those interests can be protected in a less restrictive
fashion than by the Board's decision not to allow an accommo-
dation for the plaintiffs.
C Alternative Analysis of the Burden
Judge Boggs came to the conclusion that the state did not
have an overwhelming interest in critical reading.235 More-
over, he convincingly dismissed Chief Judge Lively's analysis
of the burden in Mozert by demonstrating that compelled read-
ing from an offensive text could indeed be "conduct" that vio-
lated the plaintiffs' religious beliefs.' Even so, he agreed with
the court's decision not to allow an exemption for the plaintiffs
in Mozert,237 for even though there may have been a "common
sense" burden 2-" upon the plaintiffs, there was no burden in
the constitutional sense upon their religious beliefs.2 "9
Although Judge Boggs purportedly solved the problem in
Mozert by finding that there was no burden placed upon the
plaintiffs' religious beliefs, his opinion could be construed as
finding an overwhelming governmental interest in the integ-
rity of a democratically-controlled school system." Either
235. 827 F.2d at 1077.
236. Id. at 1075-76.
237. Id. at 1073.
238. See id. at 1079. From a common sense point of view, the economic burden of
paying for their children's education was undoubtedly greater than the loss of
compensation faced by the plaintiffs in Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), or Thomas v.
Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981). Judge Boggs later concludes that the cost of
sending a child to a private religious school in the Hawkins County area would be
twice as high as the state and local tax burden to that same family. Mozert II, 827 F.2d
at 1080.
239. 827 F.2d at 1079.
240. Id. at 1079-80. Much of Judge Boggs' opinion is based upon his contention
that to allow a challenge to the content of classroom instruction is to challenge the
very notion of politically-controlled school systems. Rather than allow that type of
challenge, school boards should be allowed to choose any curriculum they like absent
an Establishment Clause violation. Id. That type of deference to school boards looks a
great deal like a finding of an overwhelming interest that precludes any room for
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way, his opinion presents no new theoretical basis with which
to analyze free exercise cases. However, Judge Boggs' analysis
of the burden in Mozert is well worth exploring, there are
problems in his opinion that must be dealt with.
Judge Boggs began by refraining the issues of the case. He
emphasized that the plaintiffs' objections were to the Holt
series "as a whole." '241 He stated that being forced to study the
Holt series was "conduct" contrary to the plaintiff's religion. 2
He also dismissed the idea that critical reading might be an
overwhelming state interest."4 Then he began the type of
analysis required by free exercise doctrine. 4 He addressed
what he considered to be "the hard issues" of Mozert by asking
the following:
(1) [w]hether compelling this conduct forbidden by the
plaintiffs' beliefs places a burden on the free exercise of
their religion, in the sense of earlier Supreme Court hold-
ings; and (2) whether within the context of the public
schools, teaching material which offends a person's religious
beliefs, but does not violate the Establishment Clause, can be
a burden on free exercise.2 5
Addressing the first issue, Judge Boggs noted that the
Supreme Court has struggled to determine which religious
actions are protected and how significant the burden on reli-
gion must be before it triggers the strict scrutiny of the Free
Exercise Clause.24 He seemed to suggest that at times the
Court has considered how "central" or "fundamental" the
endangered belief is to the adherents of a particular religion.24 7
His point appears to be that the narrow language of the Court
in Yoder probably would not allow an exception for the plain-
tiffs in Mozert, whereas the broader language of Sherbert and
Thomas would.248 However, though the Court may have used
language in Yoder that stressed the fundamental nature of the
beliefs in question, when the Court begins to engage in a valua-
exemptions. An answer to that contention is given at infra notes 265-72 and
accompanying text.
241. Id. at 1078.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1077-78.
244. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
245. 827 F.2d at 1078 (emphasis in original).
246. Id at 1078.
247. Id. at 1079, (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205 (1972)).
248. See supra note 42.
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tion of a person's religious beliefs, it is overstepping both its
practical and institutional realm of competence." 9 Any such
valuing of religious practice must, of necessity, be a private
matter.' ° Additionally, the district court noted that although
the Court found in both Yoder and Sherbert that the endan-
gered religious belief was central and fundamental, "at no
point did the Court hold that such a finding must be made in
order to prevail on a free exercise claim. "" The district court
went on to state, "No Supreme Court decision has turned on
the issue of whether a particular belief was central to the
believer's faith."2 "2 Therefore, questions concerning the cen-
trality of particular religious practice affected by state regula-
tions ought not to be decisive in Free Exercise Clause analysis.
Yet Judge Boggs appears to argue that the significance of
the burdened belief is a factor in this case.' s He submits that
the Court more closely considered the significance of the bur-
den in Yoder because of the context in which the case arose,
namely the public school system.A4 Mozert is also, of course, a
case involving the public schools. The implication is that the
religious beliefs in Mozert must be "gravely endangered if not
destroyed by the state requirement," 55 as they were in Yoder,
before they are entitled to protection. By explaining that no
burden was placed upon the plaintiffs' beliefs in Mozert, appar-
ently Boggs did not think that these beliefs met the necessary
standard.'
This part of Judge Boggs' opinion presents a couple of
obvious problems. First, his opinion gives credence to the
notion that the centrality of a religious belief is a factor to be
249. Religion, supra note 21, at 1713-15. The Court has been unwilling and unable
to assign relative value to differing religious acts because protecting religious freedom
requires that such an ordering be private.
The Court must limit itself to evaluating the sincerity and not the content of the
claimant's belief. Id. Also, "[a]lthough courts must first determine whether a religious
interest is at stake before applying the balancing test, courts have frequently moved
beyond this threshold inquiry and have undertaken unduly searching and invasive
examinations of the centrality of particular religious practices affected by state
regulations." Id.
250. Id.
251. Mozert 1, 647 F. Supp. at 1198.
252. Id.
253. See Mozert II, 827 F2d at 1079.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See supra notes 160-75 and accompanying text (discussing how plaintiffs'
beliefs were endangered in much the same way as the plaintiffs' in Yoder).
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considered in Free Exercise Clause analysis. As noted
above,25 7 centrality of the questioned religious belief cannot be
a decisive factor when considering the possibility of a burden
upon that religious belief, for the valuing of religious tenets is
a highly subjective matter, governed in great part, if not exclu-
sively, by the individual conscience of the believer.'
Second, Judge Boggs sets up a double standard between
Free Exercise Clause claims that arise in public school con-
texts and those that occur in other contexts. It is quite clear
from his opinion that if the standard for finding a burden upon
free exercise of religion applied in Sherbert and Thomas were
applied to the plaintiffs in Mozert, a burden upon the plaintiffs'
free exercise would have existed.259 Yet Judge Boggs refused
to apply that standard, believing that the context of the public
schools required a different standard.2'0 Though there is con-
siderable debate between the individual Supreme Court jus-
tices regarding what the standard should be for finding a
burden upon the free exercise of religion 261 in any context, no
justice has suggested that there ought to be a double standard.
More importantly, the standard for finding a burden that
Judge Boggs articulated for use in the public school context is
no standard at all. He essentially stated that the decisions of
school boards should not be disturbed absent a violation of the
Establishment Clause.262 As articulated in the opening section
of this Note, the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise
Clause protect differing interests. 63 But according to Judge
Boggs, the Free Exercise Clause and its attendant interests
become nonexistent when school boards have rendered deci-
257. See supra note 249-50 and accompanying text.
258. Some commentators believe that the centrality of a religious tenet is an
important factor in Free Exercise Clause analysis. See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 25, at
386. But again, as a practical matter, it is difficult to conceive of how a court might
have a more proper view of what is important to a particular religious adherent than
does the religious adherent. Additionally, the standard of "centrality" is itself quite
vague. The question of what makes a particular belief "central" is sure to evoke
widely disparate answers from different religious points of view and from different
courts and judges as well.
259. Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1079.
260. Id.
261. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); but even in Roy, though there is
some hint that there may be a higher standard for finding a burden, the true debate is
whether there ought to be a lower standard for finding a compelling state interest. See
also Religion, supra note 21 at 1709-12.
262. Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1080.
263. See supra notes 14-37 and accompanying text.
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sions, for the only restriction placed by Judge Boggs upon
school board decisions is the restriction of the Establishment
Clause.2" Such a standard, which for all practical purposes
ignores a constitutional mandate, would seem to be per se
unconstitutional.
Defining a burden in free exercise cases need not be so dif-
ficult. Despite Chief Justice Burger's rhetoric in Yoder,2" a
burden on the free exercise of religion continues to be found if
a governmental policy or action has the effect of undermining
religious belief or inhibiting religious practice.26 Since Sher-
bert,26 7 it has been relatively well-established that the denial of
an otherwise available public benefit serves to create as great a
burden as that created by the government in fining or punish-
ing a person for practicing his or her religion.268 The Supreme
Court has not vascillated so greatly when determining what
creates a burden26 9 as it has in determining how compelling a
state interest must be before an exemption can be denied.270
Thus, the standard for finding a burden ought not to change
from case to case. What should change is the relative weight of
that burden when compared to a state interest.
To Judge Boggs, a religious challenge to the content of
public school instruction was a broader challenge than one
brought against a state's unemployment compensation statute.
He thought that it was "a substantial imposition on the schools
to require them to justify each instance of not dealing with stu-
dents' individual, religiously compelled objections" to the con-
tent of instruction.2 1 Yet, if requiring school boards to justify
failing to accommodate religious objectors is an imposition, it is
no greater an imposition than has been placed upon legisla-
tures or other governing bodies in the pursuit of protecting
religious liberty. To attempt to distinguish between the burden
on legislatures and the burden on school boards is a futile
endeavor; both agencies must accommodate religious objectors
when their respective policies create a burden on religious
264. Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1080-81.
265. That language that emphasized the central and fundamental nature of the
Amish's religious beliefs. 406 U.S. 205, 218-19.
266. Strossen, supra note 25, at 385 n.259.
267. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
268. Id. at 404, 405; TRiBE, supra note 23, at 820; see also supra note 42 and
accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 246-52 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
271. Mozert 11, 827 F.2d at 1079-80.
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freedom. Neither body may blindly institute policies that cre-
ate a burden on religious freedom.
School boards and legislatures are representative bodies.
As such, they represent the views of their respective constitu-
encies. Yet the Constitution recognizes that representative
democracy does not always sufficiently protect the rights of
every interest group. It therefore mandates the protection of
the minority when representative government fails to protect
the rights of the few against the majority. This process is not
destructive of the democratically controlled school board or
legislature; it merely prevents the school board or legislature
from enforcing their policies to the point of oppression.
Additionally, it must be remembered that in free exercise
cases, the decision of the governmental body, in this case the
Board, is not removed or overturned. 2 Thus, Mozert is not a
case in which the judiciary may have substituted its decision in
place of the Board's. It is instead a case in which the judiciary,
if it had allowed an exemption, would have limited the scope of
the Board's decision, protecting only particular plaintiffs from
its effect. The decision of the Board would have remained
intact except to the extent that it unfairly burdened particular
students. It therefore cannot be said that an exemption for the
plaintiffs would have been destructive of the system as a
whole, as Judge Boggs seems to contend.
Judge Boggs' concern was that any finding of a burden
upon the plaintiffs' in Mozert be, as it ought to be, supported
by Supreme Court precedent. Although his analysis was dis-
tinct from that of Chief Judge Lively, he concluded that no
unconstitutional burden was placed upon the plaintiffs. Judge
Boggs' conclusion was based on what he perceived to be a
higher standard for a finding of a burden in the public school
context, along with his concern that curricular challenges
would undermine the democratic control of the school system.
However, though the Supreme Court has struggled with how
much weight to assign to a state's interest opposing a particular
religious request for accommodation, the Court has not sup-
ported any type of double standard that might mandate a
higher showing of a burden in certain contexts. Neither has it
based a decision on how central a threatened religious belief or
practice might be to a religious objector's particular religion.
Additionally, though Free Exercise Clause doctrine may
272. See supra text accompanying note 66.
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not permit a religious exemption when the exemption would
undermine an entire statutory system, such a threat of under-
mining the democratic control of the school system does not
exist in Mozert. Allowing an exception from the Board's deci-
sion to use the Holt series does not put an end to the Board's
power to make curricular choices or even to use the Holt
series. The Board is only prevented from exercising its will to
the point of indirectly oppressing particular religious sects.
Therefore, the concerns of Judge Boggs ought not to have
prevented the granting of an exemption to the plaintiffs in
Mozert.
D. Allowing an Exemption: The District Court
Decision Reconsidered
Supreme Court precedents have allowed exemptions for
religious objectors from facially neutral statutes when a bur-
den can be demonstrated and when no overwhelming govern-
mental interest precludes granting an exemption.273 The three
appellate judges that considered Mozert concluded that no
impermissible burden was placed upon the plaintiffs. Alterna-
tively, Judge Kennedy separately concluded that overwhelm-
ing government interests existed that ought to have precluded
granting an exemption. Consequently, the appellate court
declined to allow the plaintiffs the remedy of opting out of the
public school reading program.
However, it is suggested that the conclusions of the appel-
late court were either based upon erroneous interpretations of
Supreme Court precedent or upon a failure to consider all of
the factors that might bear upon the education of children.
Therefore, it seems proper to consider once again the remain-
ing alternative in solving Free Exercise Clause cases: the alter-
native of granting an exemption to the religious objectors. An
exemption appears to be the least restrictive means of satisfy-
ing the government's interest in the education of its
children.274
Before a court can consider whether a plaintiff's free exer-
cise of religion has been burdened, the court must conclude
that the endangered beliefs are religious 275 and that they are
273. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 32; see also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982)
(even though no exemption was allowed, the same standard was articulated).
275. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
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sincerely held.276 In Mozert, the parties made a joint stipula-
tion before trial stating that the plaintiffs' beliefs were reli-
gious and that they were sincerely held. 7
The plaintiffs must further demonstrate that the actions of
the government actually burdened their religious beliefs. The
defendants in Mozert argued that the plaintiffs must show that
the endangered religious beliefs were "central" to the plain-
tiffs' religion before those beliefs could be impermissibly bur-
dened by the Board's action.278 The district court properly
rejected that argument, relying on Supreme Court precedent
that did not require such a finding.279
What the plaintiffs did demonstrate was that themes con-
tained in the Holt series continually contradicted a number of
values inherent in the plaintiffs' particular brand of Christian-
ity . 0 Judge Hull of the district court concluded that themes
in the Holt series contradicted the plaintiffs' beliefs and noted
that the Holt series obviously taught more than just how to
read.2s '
The plaintiff-parents sincerely believed that to allow their
children to continually read the Holt series stories, which they
thought undermined their religious beliefs, might lead the chil-
dren to adopt views contradictory to Christianity.28 2 Thus,
they concluded that their religion required them to keep their
children from studying the Holt series.2 ss It is quite difficult, if
not impossible, for a court to decide for the plaintiffs where to
draw a line that would proscribe certain activities or courses of
study and allow others. More importantly, the Supreme Court
has refused to involve itself in such line drawing; having left
that choice to the individual believer.2"
Thomas v. Review Board is a good example of the
Supreme Court's refusal to act as parent. In Thomas, a Jeho-
vah's Witness was transferred to a section of a manufacturing
276. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).
277. 647 F. Supp. at 1197.
278. Id. at 1198.
279. Id. (relying on Sherbert, Yoder, and Thomas).
280. Mozert 1H, 827 F.2d at 1076 (Boggs, J., concurring) (the plaintiffs provided
voluminous testimony of the conflict [in their view] between reading the Holt readers
and their religious beliefs, including extensive Scriptural references).
281. Mozert 1, 647 F. Supp. at 1199 n.8.
282. Id. at 1199.
283. Id.; Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1076.
284. Mozert II, 827 F.2d at 1076 (citing Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 714
(1981)).
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operation where he would have been forced to hook up chains
to a conveyor on a tank turret assembly line. Thomas refused
to work in that department because the work would be "aiding
in the manufacture of items used in the advancement of
war."285 As a pacifist, Thomas surely could not object to hook-
ing up chains to a conveyor and he probably had no specific
command that proscribed working on a tank or other arma-
ment assembly line. Yet Thomas drew his line and the Court
did not attempt to redraw it for him. It instead stated that"religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit first amendment
protection."28
The plaintiffs in Mozert have drawn their line; they
believe that their religion compels them to refrain from read-
ing the Holt series. The courts are not in a position to say that
the plaintiffs are wrong in their belief "despite the fact that
many people holding more orthodox religious beliefs might
find the plaintiffs' beliefs inconsistent, illogical, incomprehensi-
ble, and unacceptable." 7 Moreover, as a consequence of fol-
lowing their religious beliefs, the plaintiffs have been forced to
forego public education in Hawkins County. As the Court in
Thomas said, "Where the state conditions receipt of an impor-
tant benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or
where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by
religious belief, . . . a burden upon religion exists. While the
compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exer-
cise is nonetheless substantial."' Accordingly, a burden ought
to have been found upon the Mozert plaintiffs' free exercise of
religion, and an exemption ought to have been allowed, unless
an overwhelming government interest would have precluded
such an exemption.
An overwhelming state interest is indeed present in
Mozert, but it is not in critical reading as Judge Kennedy con-
tended. 89 It is, rather, a paramount government interest in
the education of its young. Both plaintiffs and defendants
285. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 711.
286. Id. at 714. The court in Thomas graphically demonstrated how personal this
religious line drawing actually is by noting that a different Jehovah's Witness drew his
line more liberally; he would have been willing to work on the tank turret line. Id. at
711 n.4.
287. Mozert 1, 647 F. Supp. at 1198-99.
288. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-718.
289. See supra notes 189-207 and accompanying text.
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agreed that the state's interest in educating its children was
overwhelming.2" The question, when an overwhelming inter-
est exists, is whether that interest can be protected in a less
restrictive fashion.291 In other words, can the interest be pro-
tected without imposing the challenged burden upon the plain-
tiffs? More specifically, can Tennessee's interest in educating
its children be met without forcing the plaintiff-students to
read the Holt series?
It seems obvious that this question must be answered in the
affirmative. The legislative enactments of this state admit as
much. Although Tennessee has manifested its compelling
interest in education through its compulsory education law,
it has, by allowing children to attend private schools or to be
taught at home, also acknowledged that its interests may be
accomplished in other ways and may yield to the parental
interest in a child's upbringing. Moreover, the fact that the
state has approved several basic reading series for use in the
Tennessee public schools tells us something of the expend-
ability of any particular series.292
The State legislature was itself convinced that the State's
interest in education could be met without forcing all children
to read the Holt series. For this reason, along with those
detailed in Section IV (B) of this Note,23 Tennessee's interest
in educating its young should not preclude granting an exemp-
tion to the plaintiffs in Mozert.
There remains the question of what type of exemption
ought to be granted. The plaintiffs sought the right to read
from alternative reading texts.294 The district court was
unwilling to grant such an accommodation for fear that it
would run afoul of the Establishment Clause. 5 The court
concluded that providing the alternative texts would probably
require additional preparation for the classroom teachers or
might even require hiring part-time tutors to help the plaintiff-
students with the alternative texts. 6 It is true that the evi-
dence at trial demonstrated that such an accommodation could
work without causing undue disruption of the educational pro-
290. Mozert 1, 647 F. Supp at 1200-02.
291. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
292. Mozert 1, 647 F. Supp. at 1201.
293. See supra notes 208-33 and accompanying text.
294. Mozert 1, 647 F. Supp. at 1202.
295. Id. at 1203.
296. Id.
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cess. 297 But the court properly considered that any in-class
accommodation of the plaintiff-students might violate the
Establishment Clause because the other students might per-
ceive the school to be favoring, endorsing, or simply manifest-
ing approval of the plaintiffs' religion.298 The Supreme Court
has regularly ruled that curricular decisions violate the Estab-
lishment Clause without much, if any, specific evidence that
reasonable students perceived the school to be endorsing reli-
gion; often the decision has been based on the mere potential
that students may perceive the school to be approving of
religion.2"
Therefore, the district court allowed the plaintiff-students
to opt-out of the reading class portion of the public school cur-
riculum altogether, providing that the plaintiff-students met
the state's reading requirement in some other fashion, either
by home schooling or by private tutelage.3s° Judge Hull logi-
cally concluded that since the state allowed "a complete opt-
out, a total curriculum alternative, in its home schooling stat-
ute . . .that this alternative could also work effectively for a
single subject." 0'
The ability to opt-out is not necessarily a new idea. Legis-
latures and other lower courts have allowed religious objectors
to opt-out of classes that burden their religious beliefs. For
example, students have been allowed to opt-out of sex educa-
tion classes,3 °2 folk dancing,0 3 coeducational P.E. classes, °
297. Id. at 1202; see supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
298. Mozert , 647 F. Supp. at 1203.
299. See Strossen, supra note 25, at 363; but cJf TRIBE, supra note 23, at 822
(actions that are arguably compelled by the Free Exercise Clause are not forbidden by
the Establishment Clause); id. at 833 ("free exercise principle should be dominant in
any conflict with the anti-establishment principle. Such dominance is the natural
result of tolerating religion as broadly as possible rather than thwarting at all cost
even the faintest appearance of establishment.").
300. Mozert I, 647 F. Supp. at 1203.
As the court envisions the opt-out program, each of the student-plaintiffs would
withdraw to a study hall or to the library during his or her regular reading period at
school and would study reading with a parent later at home. The home schooling
portion of the child's education would be proportionately subject to the provision of
the [home schooling] statute. TENN. CODE ANN. § § 49-6-3050(b). The child's reading
proficiency would be rated by the standardized achievement tests used by the state. If
deficiencies develop, the parents and school officials should confer to facilitate
improvement. Id.
301. Mozert I, 647 F. Supp. at 1203.
302. McCARTHY, supra note 2, at 60 (generally noting a number of examples).
303. Harwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696, 205 P. 49 (1921).
304. Moody v. Cronin, 484 F. Supp. 270 (C.D. Ill. 1979).
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and R.O.T.C.305 It is true that in each of the above examples
the plaintiff-students were excused from non-core subjects.
But it is also true that many times the accommodated student
was exempted from any requirement to participate in such
instruction.' In Mozert, the decision of the district court did
not exempt the plaintiffs from the reading requirement alto-
gether. It simply provided an alternative means by which the
reading requirement could be met without burdening the
plaintiffs' free exercise of religion. Thus, an ability to opt-out
could easily be considered a sensible application of an option
allowed in other contexts, as well as a logical extension of Ten-
nessee law that allows for alternative education. Such a solu-
tion also appears to be safer when considering Establishment
Clause concerns. It requires no additional work from existing
teachers or administrators, nor does it risk conveying the
school's support for the plaintiffs' religion.'
Because of the weakness of the rationales articulated by
the appellate court, granting an exemption for the plaintiffs in
Mozert ought to be seriously considered. Judge Hull of the dis-
trict court appears to have constructed a remedy that is sensi-
tive to the burden placed on the plaintiffs and the educational
interests of the state, as well as the requirements of the Estab-
lishment Clause.
V. CONCLUSION
In every free exercise case, the court must consider the
delicate question of whether there is actually a burden placed
upon the plaintiffs' religious beliefs. The question was more
difficult in Mozert, because the alleged burdened was a per-
ceived emphasis upon objectionable values in educational read-
ing materials. Yet, considering the age of the plaintiff-students
involved, it is difficult to conclude that emphasizing values con-
trary to their religious beliefs was not a burden upon their free
exercise of religion.
Additionally, any standard for finding a burden upon the
plaintiffs' religion that ignores the protections granted by the
Free Exercise Clause must be rejected whether applied in the
public school context or otherwise. The Supreme Court has
set a precedent of substantive religious neutrality that both
305. Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1972).
306. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at 59-64.
307. Mozert 1, 647 F. Supp. at 1203.
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government and school boards must follow. The Hawkins
County School Board is not entitled to exceptional deference
simply because it is a school board. It must still operate and
govern within the limits of the protections granted by the reli-
gion clauses.
Furthermore, any governmental interest that might pre-
clude accommodating religious objectors must be of the highest
order. The State of Tennessee has an overwhelming interest
in the education of its citizens. Yet this interest in education
can quite obviously be met in some way other than by the
mandatory reading of the Holt series by all students.
The opt-out remedy afforded the plaintiffs by the district
court appears to be the best way to solve the Mozert dilemma.
It considers the sensibilities of the school children and the
interests of the parents in their upbringing. It follows
Supreme Court precedent defining a burden on religious exer-
cise at least as broadly as do the plaintiffs. It also avoids the
potential violations of the Establishment Clause that an in-
class accommodation might create.
Accordingly, the decision of the district court should have
been reinstated.
Keith Kemper
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